夏天成

• 1:安徽大学哲学学院

摘要(Abstract)：

当代生命伦理学的自主原则饱受质疑，而女性主义生命伦理学提供了一个有效的反思视角。主流生命伦理学的自主概念具有典型的义务论和功利主义特征，并以无性别的理性主体作为潜在基础，因此女性主义生命伦理学认为自主原则隐含着对男性的偏爱和对女性的排斥，是一种基于特定性别的狭隘自主。基于此，女性主义生命伦理学主张从经验主义考察自主性中的性别差异，并从构建主义视角反思自主原则的主体基础和权力关系。虽然女性主义生命伦理学也面临折中主义和相对主义困难，但有助于反思当代生命伦理学的差异化发展以及自主原则的改造应用。同时，在当前我国生育政策的重大变革背景下，其分析和主张也能够为反思女性的生育自主问题提供借鉴。

关键词(KeyWords)： 自主;主体;权力;女性主义生命伦理学

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 安徽省2021年高校优秀青年人才支持计划重点项目“福柯的身体与生命政治理论研究”（gxyqZD2021002）；安徽大学质量工程项目“科技哲学与逻辑学教学团队”（2022MSXM102）

作者(Author): 夏天成

DOI: 10.19524/j.cnki.10-1009/g3.2022.02.063

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