科学史和科学哲学之间过去与现在的联系
William R. Shea,范岱年
摘要(Abstract)：
科学史学家和科学哲学家之间的合作时常被推崇为一种突破而不是惯例。科学史学家有时把他们自己局限于严格叙述性地积累过去科学的详尽史料,而在逻辑实证论影响下的科学哲学家们,则时常鼓吹一种与价值无关、与历史无关的科学模式:所谓“无关”,确实是除了逻辑工具和语义学之外,几乎与一切东西无关。近年来,这两个学科之间的交流已经建立起来了,我们发现日益增多的哲学家在考察各门科学中的历史案例,以便揭示科学推理的结构,并按照在历史过程中实际呈现的那样来理解科学概念。
关键词(KeyWords)：
基金项目(Foundation):
作者(Author): William R. Shea,范岱年
参考文献(References)：
- 中译文见《卡尔纳普思想自述》,上海译文出版社,1985年版,第90页。此处译文稍有改动。--译者注
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